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The distributive ignorance puzzle1
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Abstract. We observe that verbs like wonder do not just imply that their subject does not know
the answer to the embedded question, but a stronger form of ignorance, which we call distribu-
tive ignorance. This is not predicted by existing work on the semantics of wonder, and we
argue that it cannot be straightforwardly derived as a pragmatic inference either. We consider
two possible semantic accounts, and conclude in favor of one on which the lexical semantics of
wonder involves exhaustification w.r.t. structural alternatives as well as sub-domain alternatives
of its complement.
Keywords: wonder, ignorance, inquisitive semantics, exhaustivity.
1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with clause-embedding predicates such as wonder, investigate and be
curious. These predicates have two things in common. First, in terms of selectional restrictions,
they only take interrogative clauses as their complement, not declarative ones:
(1) The doctor is wondering what the patient ate / *that the patient ate.
(2) The doctor is investigating what the patient ate / *that the patient ate.
(3) The doctor is curious what the patient ate / *that the patient ate.
Second, in semantic terms, they each imply, roughly, that their subject is ignorant with respect
to the issue expressed by the complement and interested in resolving this issue.
We will refer to predicates with these two properties as INQUISITIVE PREDICATES,2 and we
will be concerned in this paper with the kind of ignorance that they imply on the part of their
subject. Our starting point is a simple but novel empirical observation: when an inquisitive
predicate takes an alternative question as its complement, it implies ignorance about all the
alternatives introduced. For instance, John wonders whether Ann, Bill, or Carol arrived implies
that John is ignorant as to whether Ann arrived, as to whether Bill arrived, and as to whether
Carol arrived. We will show that this DISTRIBUTIVE IGNORANCE implication is not predicted
by existing work on the semantics of wonder, even if we take pragmatic strengthening into
account. We will then consider two ways of accounting for distributive ignorance: one directly
encodes it in the lexical entry for wonder, the other derives it as a consequence of a lexicalized
1We are grateful to Ivano Ciardelli, Alexandre Cremers, Clemens Mayr, Yael Sharvit, Benjamin Spector, and
two anonymous Sinn und Bedeutung reviewers for very helpful comments and discussion. We gratefully acknowl-
edge financial support from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), the Japan Society for
the Promotion of Science (JSPS), and the European Research Council (ERC, grant agreement number 680220).
2For Karttunen (1977), the class of inquisitive predicates also includes speech act predicates such as ask and
inquire. We will leave such predicates out of consideration here since they do not semantically imply that the
subject is ignorant (although this is often pragmatically implicated). In particular, in examples where the subject
is a teacher or a quiz master, it is clear that she need not be ignorant about the answer to the embedded question.
exhaustive inference. We will argue that the exhaustivity-based account is preferable, since
it better accounts for distributive ignorance when the complement is a wh-question or a polar
disjunctive question rather than an alternative question. Throughout, we will focus on the case
of wonder, but the arguments apply to other inquisitive predicates as well.
The paper is structured as follows: §2 briefly reviews existing work on the semantics of wonder;
§3 introduces the distributive ignorance puzzle; §4 considers a pragmatic account, and the
challenges it faces; §5 specifies two semantic approaches, and §6 attempts to tease these two
apart with additional empirical observations.
2. Background on the semantics of wonder
Our theoretical point of departure here is the semantics for wonder proposed by Ciardelli and
Roelofsen (2015), henceforth C&R.3 Informally, the idea behind this account is that wondering
ϕ amounts to (i) not knowing an answer to the issue expressed by ϕ , and (ii) entertaining the
issue expressed by ϕ . To make this idea more precise, C&R develop a formal framework
called inquisitive epistemic logic (IEL), combining notions from standard epistemic logic and
inquisitive semantics. We will briefly review the relevant features of the framework, and then
spell out the proposed semantics for wonder.
Information states and sentence meanings An INFORMATION STATE is modeled in epistemic
logic as a set of possible worlds, namely those worlds that are compatible with the information
available in the state. The MEANING OF A SENTENCE, whether declarative or interrogative,
is modeled in inquisitive semantics as a set of information states, those states where (i) the
information conveyed by the sentence is established, and (ii) the issue raised by the sentence is
resolved. For instance:
• JBill leftK = {s | ∀w ∈ s : Bill left in w}
• JDid Bill leaveK = {s | ∀w ∈ s : Bill left in w}∪{s | ∀w ∈ s : Bill did not leave in w}
• JWho leftK = {s | ∃d ∈ D : ∀w ∈ s : d left in w} [mention-some]
The meaning of a sentence in inquisitive semantics is always non-empty and closed under
subsets: if s ∈ JϕK and s′ ⊂ s then s′ ∈ JϕK as well (for motivation of these constraints on
sentence meanings, see Ciardelli et al., 2015). The maximal elements of JϕK are called the
ALTERNATIVES in JϕK, denoted ALT(ϕ). For instance:
• ALT(Bill left) = {{w | Bill left in w}}
• ALT(Did Bill leave) = {{w | Bill left in w},{w | Bill didn’t leave in w}}
• ALT(Who left) = {{w | d left in w} | d ∈ D} [mention-some]
3For a closely related account see Uegaki (2015), and for comparison of the two see Theiler et al. (2016). For
earlier informal discussions of the semantics of wonder, see Karttunen (1977) and Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007).
Inquisitive states The INQUISITIVE STATE of an agent a, Σa, is represented in IEL as a set
of information states, namely those information states that resolve all the issues that a enter-
tains. Just like sentence meanings, inquisitive states are also assumed to be non-empty and
closed under subsets. Moreover, it is assumed that Σa always forms a cover of a’s information
state, denoted as σa:
⋃
Σa = σa (for motivation of these constraints on Σa, see Ciardelli and
Roelofsen, 2015). This means that σa can always be determined on the basis of Σa.
Modal operators, informally IEL has two basic modal operators. Informally, (i) an agent
knows ϕ iff her current information state σa is a member of JϕK, i.e., one where the issue
expressed by ϕ is resolved, and (ii) an agent entertains the issue expressed by ϕ iff every
information state in her inquisitive state is a member of JϕK, i.e., every state that resolves the
issues that she entertains is one where the issue expressed by ϕ is resolved. The semantics of
wonder is defined in terms of these two basic modal operators. Informally, an agent wonders
about ϕ iff she doesn’t know ϕ but does entertain the issue expressed by ϕ .
Models and semantics An IEL MODEL for a given set of agents A and a set of atomic sentences
P is a triple M = 〈W ,V,ΣA 〉, where (i) W is a set of POSSIBLE WORLDS, (ii) V : W 7→℘(P)
is a VALUATION MAP, and (iii) ΣA = {Σa | a ∈A } is a set of INQUISITIVE STATE MAPS, one
for each agent a ∈ A , mapping every world w ∈ W to the inquisitive state of a in w, Σa(w).
The information state of a in w, σa(w), is defined as
⋃
Σa(w). The semantics for the non-modal
fragment of IEL is just that of basic inquisitive semantics. For the knowledge and entertain
modality, the semantics is as described informally above:
(4) a. [[A]] := {s | ∀w ∈ s : A ∈V (w)} for any atomic sentence A ∈P
b. [[¬ϕ]] := {s | ∀t ∈ [[ϕ]] : s∩ t =∅}
c. [[ϕ ∧ψ]] := [[ϕ]]∩ [[ψ]]
d. [[ϕ ∨ψ]] := [[ϕ]]∪ [[ψ]]
e. [[Kaϕ]] := {s | ∀w ∈ s : σa(w) ∈ [[ϕ]]}
f. [[Eaϕ]] := {s | ∀w ∈ s : Σa(w)⊆ [[ϕ]]}
If s ∈ [[ϕ]] we say that s supports ϕ . If ϕ is supported by a state of complete information {w},
then we say that ϕ is true in w, notation w |= ϕ:
(5) w |= ϕ ⇐⇒ {w} ∈ [[ϕ]]
It follows from the semantics given in (4) that modal statements of the form Kaϕ and Eaϕ are
supported by a state s if and only if they are true in every world in s. Thus, in the case of modal
statements, support is fully determined by truth (this does not hold in general, in particular
not for disjunctions). To simplify the exposition, we may therefore just as well focus on the
truth-conditions of such statements, which are as follows:
(6) a. w |= Kaϕ ⇐⇒ σa(w) ∈ [[ϕ]]
b. w |= Eaϕ ⇐⇒ Σa(w)⊆ [[ϕ]]
As anticipated above the wonder modality in IEL, W , is defined in terms of the basic modal
operators K and E, as in (7). This means that it has the truth-conditions specified in (8):
(7) Waϕ := ¬Kaϕ ∧Eaϕ
(8) w |=Waϕ ⇐⇒ σa(w) 6∈ [[ϕ]] ∧ Σa(w)⊆ [[ϕ]]
IEL can be extended into a compositional, type-theoretic framework (cf., Ciardelli et al., 2016).
English wonder can then be translated into the formal language of this framework as follows:
(9) pwonderq = λQ〈st,t〉λxe.Wx(Q)
For a full sentence involving wonder we then get the following:4
(10) a. pJohn wonders whether Ann or Bill arrived.q = Wj(A∨B)
b. w |=Wj(A∨B) ⇐⇒ σ j(w) 6∈ [[A∨B]] ∧ Σ j(w)⊆ [[A∨B]]
c. John’s current information state doesn’t resolve the question whether A or B, but
every information state that resolves the issues that he entertains is one in which
the question whether A or B is resolved.
Before closing this background section it is worth mentioning that C&R’s semantics predicts
that wonder does not license declarative complements, assuming that the meaning of a declar-
ative complement always contains a single alternative. Namely, whenever W applies to a sen-
tence whose meaning contains a single alternative, it yields a contradiction.
3. Problem: distributive ignorance
C&R’s semantics of wonder faces an empirical problem. Consider the following example:
(11) Situation John has three students, Ann, Bill and Carol. He is waiting for all of them
to arrive at a lab meeting. Someone knocks at the door, but John knows that it
can’t be Carol because she has just emailed him that she will be late.
Example John wonders whether Ann, Bill or Carol arrived. (Judgment: False)
The above example is judged false in the given situation. The sentence is true only if John’s
information state is compatible with every alternative expressed by the complement, i.e., the
sets of worlds in which Ann arrived, Bill arrived, and Carol arrived, respectively. Moreover,
John’s information state should not entail any of these alternatives. Together, this means that
the truth of (11) requires that, for each alternative, John is ignorant as to whether it holds.
4For simplicity, we assume here that the embedded alternative question whether Ann or Bill arrived is trans-
lated into IEL as A∨B, disregarding the fact that alternative questions presuppose that exactly one of the disjuncts
holds. This simplification does not affect the arguments that we will make.
Figure 1: The meaning of the complement, John’s inquisitive state Σ j, and John’s information

















More generally, for any individual-denoting DP x and any alternative question ϕ , the sentence
x wonders ϕ implies that x is ignorant about each of the alternative answers to ϕ . We refer
to this requirement in the meaning of wonder as the DISTRIBUTIVE IGNORANCE requirement.
Later, we will discuss in detail what this requirement looks like in examples with wh-questions
and polar questions. For now, however, let us focus on explaining why the distributive igno-
rance requirement that arises with alternative questions is a problem for C&R’s account.
To see this, consider the example in (11) again. C&R’s semantics incorrectly predicts that (11)
is true in the given situation. This is so since John’s current information state does not resolve
the question of whether A, B or C, but every information state that resolves the issues that he
is entertaining, i.e., every element of his inquisitive state, is one that does resolve the question
whether A, B or C. Formally, we have the following:
(12) pJohn wonders whether Ann, Bill or Carol arrived.q = Wj(A∨B∨C)
(13) w |=Wj(A∨B∨C) ⇐⇒ σ j(w) 6∈ [[A∨B∨C]] and Σ j(w)⊆ [[A∨B∨C]]
The meaning of the complement, John’s inquisitive state Σ j, and his information state σ j are as
follows in the given situation (see Figure 1 for graphical representations):
(14) a. [[A∨B∨C]] = [[A]]∪ [[B]]∪ [[C]] (meaning of the complement)
b. Σ j = {s | s ∈ [[A]]∪ [[B]] and ∀t ∈ [[C]] : s∩ t =∅} (John’s inquisitive state)
c. σ j = {w | (w ∈
⋃
[[A]] or w ∈
⋃
[[B]]) and w 6∈
⋃
[[C]]} (John’s information state)
Thus, the truth conditions in (13) are indeed met in the given situation, since (14c) is not a
member of (14a) while (14b) is a subset of (14a). This prediction is incorrect.
4. A pragmatic account and its challenges
4.1. The distributive ignorance requirement as a conversational implicature
Prima facie, one may think that the distributive ignorance requirement could be explained prag-
matically, while retaining C&R’s semantics for wonder. A possible pragmatic derivation of the
requirement would go as follows. The speaker of (11) could have uttered another sentence with
a shorter disjunction, such as the one in (15):
(11) John wonders whether Ann, Bill or Chris arrived.
(15) John wonders whether Ann or Bill arrived.
The alternative in (15) would have been a simpler, presumably still relevant, way to describe
John’s state. Thus, we could derive the negation of (15) as an implicature, which has the
following truth conditions:
(16) w |= ¬Wj(A∨B) ⇐⇒ σ j ∈ JAK∪ JBK or Σ j 6⊆ JAK∪ JBK
Distributive ignorance can be derived from this implicature, together with the assumed literal
meaning of the sentence. Namely, the ignorance condition in the literal meaning implies that
σ j 6∈ JAK∪ JBK. Therefore, for the implicature to hold it must be the case that Σ j 6⊆ JAK∪ JBK.
But the ‘entertainment’ condition in the literal meaning says that Σ j ⊆ JAK∪ JBK∪ JCK. This
allows us to conclude that Σ j∩ JCK 6= {∅}, which in turn implies that John’s information state,
σ j must be compatible with
⋃
JCK. Following the same line of reasoning for the other disjuncts,




JBK as well. At the same time,






JCK, due to the ignorance condition in the literal







Thus, we see that the distributive ignorance requirement of (11) can be derived as a prag-
matic inference. However, there are empirical features of the distributive ignorance require-
ment which, at face value, do not seem to be in line with the traditional Gricean conception of
pragmatic implicatures. Below, we describe three such empirical features.
4.2. Challenges for the pragmatic account
4.2.1. Non-monotonicity of wonder
First of all, due to the non-monotonicity of C&R’s semantics for wonder, the sentence in (15)
is actually not stronger than the original sentence in (11). For instance, (15) is true while (11)
is false when John’s inquisitive state is as follows:
(17) Σ j = {s | s ∈ JAK∪ JBK and s ∈ JCK}
Since quantity implicatures under the traditional Gricean conception arise only with respect to
strictly stronger alternatives, the fact that (15) is not strictly stronger than (11) suggests that the
inference cannot be treated as a traditional quantity implicature.
One might suggest that the ignorance condition in the semantics of wonder could be treated as a
presupposition, and that (15) would then indeed asymmetrically entail (11) if we only consider
their assertive component, which would consist in the entertainment condition. However, we
submit that the ignorance condition of wonder is part of its assertive meaning, given that it does
not exhibit the projection behavior of presuppositions. The following examples show that it
does not project out of (a) negation, (b) polar questions, and (c) the attitude predicate doubt, as
evidenced by the fact that the underlined continuations are perfectly felicitous.
(18) a. The detectives are not wondering whether Ann stole the jewels.
They already know that she did.
b. A: Are the detectives wondering whether Ann stole the jewels?
B: No, they already know that she did.
c. Bill doubts that the detectives are wondering whether Ann stole the jewels.
He believes that they already know that she stole them.
This contrasts with the behavior of attitude-verb meanings whose presuppositional status is
undisputed. For example, the factive presupposition of know does exhibit the typical projection
behavior, as shown by the oddness of the contradicting continuations in the following examples
(in order to become felicitous, these continuations need a marker of presupposition denial such
as actually or in fact).
(19) a. The detectives don’t know that Ann stole the jewels.
#She didn’t steal them.
b. A: Do the detectives know that Ann stole the jewels?
B: No, they don’t. #She didn’t steal them.
c. Bill doubts that the detectives know that Ann stole the jewels.
#He doesn’t believe that she stole them.
4.2.2. Obligatoriness
The second challenge for a pragmatic account of distributive ignorance is its obligatory nature.
The following example indicates that distributive ignorance cannot be canceled, contrary to
what would be expected under a traditional Gricean approach.
(20) John wonders whether Ann, Bill or Carol arrived.
# In fact, he already knows that Carol is still at home, but he doesn’t know yet whether
Ann or Bill arrived.
At this point, it should be mentioned that not all Gricean analyses of implicatures predict can-
cellability as a necessary feature. In particular, Lauer (2014) points out that Gricean pragmatics
predicts that an obligatory implicature arises if an utterance of an expression necessarily makes
a more preferred expression salient. Lauer (2014) argues that this is exactly the case with
the ignorance implicature of unembedded disjunctions since an utterance of the form α or β
necessarily makes each disjunct salient (see also Westera, 2017).
It is conceivable that Lauer’s analysis can be applied to the distributive ignorance requirement
of wonder, correctly capturing its obligatory nature within a pragmatic approach. However,
such an analysis would still face the non-monotonicity issue discussed above, and would also
have difficulty capturing the locality of distributive ignorance, to which we turn next.
4.2.3. Locality
The distributive ignorance requirement of wonder is local, in the sense that it takes scope below
operators that are syntactically above wonder. The following example illustrates this:
(21) Situation There is a crime with three suspects, Ann, Bill, and Carol. There are five
detectives investigating the case; one has already ruled out Carol but is still won-
dering whether it was Ann or Bill. The others don’t know anything yet.
Example Exactly four detectives are wondering whether it was Ann, Bill, or Carol.
(Judgment: true)
The judgment that this example is true can only be accounted for if the distributive ignorance
requirement takes scope below the subject quantifier exactly four detectives. If the distributive
ignorance requirement is derived as a global pragmatic implicature, the sentence would be
predicted to be false. Here’s why: the literal meaning of the given sentence would be that
exactly four detectives are such that (i) they don’t know whether it was Ann, Bill, or Carol, and
(ii) every information state they want to be in resolves the issue of whether it was Ann, Bill,
or Carol. This is false in the situation above since all five detectives meet these conditions.
Adding implicatures to the literal meaning of the sentence could only strengthen it and could
thus not make it true in the given situation.
The following example further strengthens our claim that distributive ignorance scopes locally:
(22) Situation There is a crime with three suspects, Ann, Bill, and Carol. There are three
detectives investigating the case.
• Detective 1 has ruled out Ann but still wonders whether it was Bill or Carol.
• Detective 2 has ruled out Bill but still wonders whether it was Ann or Carol.
• Detective 3 has ruled out Carol but still wonders whether it was Ann or Bill.5
5We thank Benjamin Spector for drawing our attention to this type of situations.
Example Every detective is wondering whether it was Ann, Bill, or Carol.
(Judgment: false)
The judgment that this example is false makes sense if the distributive ignorance requirement
takes scope under every detective. On the other hand, a global derivation of the pragmatic
inference would predict the sentence to be true. Here’s why: the predicted implicatures would
be as follows:
(23) a. It is not the case that every detective wonders whether it was Ann or Bill.
b. It is not the case that every detective wonders whether it was Bill or Carol.
c. It is not the case that every detective wonders whether it was Carol or Ann.
and so on...
These implicatures are all true in the given situation. The presence of detectives 1 and 2 makes
(23a) true. The presence of detectives 2 and 3 makes (23b) true. The presence of detectives 1
and 3 makes (23c) true.
The locality of distributive ignorance is a challenge for the pragmatic approach since prag-
matic maxims are traditionally assumed to apply globally, i.e., to the sentence as a whole.6
Certain apparently local implicatures have been explained within pragmatic approaches that
are essentially Gricean in nature (see, e.g., Franke, 2009). It is possible that such pragmatic
theories could ultimately derive local distributive ignorance implicatures with wonder as well.
However, it is not immediately clear, to us, how this may be achieved.
We have seen, then, that a ‘conservative’ approach, which maintains C&R’s semantics for
wonder and tries to derive the distributive ignorance requirement pragmatically, encounters
a number of challenges. However, this is of course not the only possible approach. Another
option is to reconsider C&R’s semantics of wonder and see if it could be adapted so as to derive
the distributive ignorance requirement directly, without pragmatics. Clearly, such an approach
would directly predict the obligatory and local nature of the distributive ignorance requirement.
Moreover, it would steer clear of the non-monotonicity issue that the pragmatic approach faces.
This is the route that we will take in the remainder of this paper.
6Locality also distinguishes wonder from other predicates, such as believe. Although believe also implies
distributive ignorance when taking a referential subject, as illustrated in (i) below, examples with quantificational
subjects reveal that this implication is not local, as illustrated in (ii) and (iii).
(i) John believes that it was Ann, Bill, or Carol. (implies distributive ignorance)
(ii) Exactly four detectives believe that it was Ann, Bill, or Carol. (false in (21))
(iii) Every detective believes that it was Ann, Bill, or Carol. (true in (22))
This contrast between wonder and believe suggests that distributive ignorance with wonder is a local implication
associated with the semantics of the predicate itself while distributive ignorance with believe is a global pragmatic
implicature that arises regardless of the embedding predicate.
5. Two semantic accounts
We will consider two ways to adapt C&R’s semantics. The first (§5.1) directly strengthens the
ignorance requirement in the lexical semantics of wonder. The second (§5.2) leaves C&R’s
basic entry for wonder in tact, but additionally assumes that the semantics of the verb involves
an exhaustivity operator, just like the semantics of only.7 The main difference between these
two accounts is that on the former, wonder remains sensitive only to the semantic content of the
clause that it combines with, while on the second, due to the exhaustivity operator, it becomes
sensitive to the formal structure of its complement clause as well. In §6 we will attempt to tease
these two accounts apart based on data involving polar questions and wh-questions.
5.1. Directly encoding strong ignorance
In C&R’s semantics of wonder, the ignorance condition is encoded as ¬Kaϕ . That is, the
subject’s information state must not be contained in any alternative in JϕK. This is a relatively
weak notion of ignorance. A natural way to strengthen it would be to require that, in addition,
the subject’s information state should be compatible with every alternative in JϕK. Let us
introduce a new modal operator, I, which expresses this strong form of ignorance:
(24) w |= Iaϕ ⇐⇒ ∀α ∈ ALT(ϕ) : σa(w) 6⊆ α and σa(w)∩α 6=∅
Using this strong ignorance operator, we can then re-define the wonder modality in IEL:
(25) Waϕ := Iaϕ ∧Eaϕ
This analysis directly encodes the distributive ignorance requirement in the lexical semantics
of wonder. Clearly, the local and obligatory nature of the requirement are straightforwardly
captured in this way.
5.2. Strong ignorance via exhaustivity
We now consider a more indirect account, which supplements C&R’s entry for wonder with
a built-in exhaustivity operator. We will assume that this exhaustivity operator is sensitive to
the formal structure of the complement clause, rather than just its semantic content, because
an account involving a purely semantic exhaustivity operator would be difficult to distinguish
from the account specified above.
For any two natural language expressions ϕ and ϕ ′, we write ϕ ′ . ϕ iff ϕ ′ is formally simpler
7Yet another possible analysis would be one involving an exhaustivity operator in the syntax (Chierchia et al.,
2012) rather than in the lexical semantics of wonder. However, on such an approach additional assumptions would
be needed about the distribution of this operator, in order to account for the locality and obligatory nature of the
distributive ignorance requirement. For now, we leave this possible analysis out of consideration.
than ϕ in the sense of Katzir (2007), i.e., iff ψ can be obtained from ϕ by deleting constituents
or replacing them with other constituents of the same syntactic category, taken either from the
lexicon or from ϕ itself.
The exhaustivity operator that we will assume takes an expression ϕ and a set of formal alter-
natives A, and strengthens ϕ by negating every ψ ∈ A that is not entailed by ϕ:
(26) EXHA(ϕ) := ϕ ∧
∧
{¬ψ | ψ ∈ A and ϕ 6|= ψ}
Using this exhaustivity operator, the semantics of wonder can be formulated as follows:8
(27) pwonder Qq = λx.EXH{Wx(pQ′q) | Q′.Q}Wx(pQq)
The formal alternatives for exhaustification are expressions of the form WxpQ′q, where Q′ is
grammatically simpler than the original complement Q. As a result of exhaustification, x won-
ders Q negates those formal alternatives that are not entailed by Wx(pQq).9 The obligatory and
local nature of the distributive ignorance requirement follow from this analysis as well.
To see the account at work, consider the following sentence:
(28) Every detective wonders whether A, B or C.
For concreteness, let us assume that the complement in this sentence has the following struc-
ture (as far as we can see, all other reasonable assumptions about the structure of alternative
questions are compatible with our argument as well):
(29) [whether [A or [B or C]]]
Further assume that or is translated as ∨ and that whether is semantically vacuous but syn-
tactically requires at least one occurrence of or in its scope—if no such occurrence is overtly
present, as in a polar question, there must be a covert or not (cf., Guerzoni and Sharvit, 2014;
though again, other assumptions about the syntax-semantics interface of alternative questions
would be compatible with our argument as well, as far as we can tell).
This structure can be simplified by eliminating either one or two of the disjuncts; in the latter
case whether has to be eliminated as well. Such simplifications yield the following structures:
8Since the exhaustivity operator is structure-sensitive, our entry for wonder has to be syncategorematic.
9We could assume that formal alternatives are only negated if they are innocently excludable (IE), in order to
avoid potential contradictions arising from exhaustification (Fox, 2007):
(i) EXHA(ϕ) := ϕ ∧
∧
{ψ | ψ ∈ IE(ϕ,A)}
(ii) IE(ϕ,A) :=
⋂
{A′ ⊆ A | A′ is a maximal subset of A s.t.{¬ϕ ′|ϕ ′ ∈ A′}∪{ϕ} is consistent}
However, we keep the simpler formulation in (26) since there would be no contradiction arising from the negation
of non-weaker alternatives in the examples under consideration.
(30) [whether [A or B]] [whether [B or C]] [whether [A or C]] A B C
Thus, the sentence in (28) receives the interpretation in (32), which means that it is correctly
predicted to be false in the scenario described in (22).10
(31) pEvery detective wonders whether A, B or Cq
= ∀x : detective(x)→ EXH{Wx(pQ′q) | Q′.whether A, B or C}Wx(A∨B∨C)










6. Teasing the two semantic accounts apart
We will now try to tease the two semantic accounts apart, by considering cases where wonder
takes a polar question or a wh-question as its complement, rather than an alternative question.
We will consider polar disjunctive questions like whether-or-not Ann or Bill arrived (§6.1),
plain wh-questions like which of the students arrived (§6.2), ones where the domain of quantifi-
cation is explicitly listed, as in which of Ann, Bill, and Carol arrived (§6.3), and ones where the
domain specification involves a numeral, as in which of John’s three students arrived (§6.4).11
6.1. Polar questions involving a disjunction
Distributive ignorance is observed also when wonder takes a polar disjunctive question com-
plement, as in the following example:12
(33) John wonders whether-or-not Ann or Bill arrived.
That is, (33) implies that John is ignorant as to whether Ann arrived and as to whether Bill ar-
rived. This is expected under the exhaustivity-based account, since the following complements
are structurally simpler alternatives for the complement in (33):
10The last three conjuncts in (32) are tautologous, so they could in principle we left out. We do display them
here just for transparency.
11We should note that the judgments reported in this section are based on introspection and discussion with a
small number of native speakers. More systematic empirical work will be needed to obtain a more reliable picture
of the relevant data.
12We use whether-or-not here, rather than just whether, in order to make sure that the complement is read as
a polar question, and not as an alternative question. The relevant observation, however, applies just as well to
complements headed by plain whether, interpreted as polar questions.
(34) a. whether-or-not Ann arrived.
b. whether-or-not Bill arrived.
Thus, (33) is predicted to imply, through exhaustivity, that ¬Wj(A∨¬A) and ¬Wj(B∨¬B).
It follows from this that John must be ignorant as to whether Ann arrived. To see this, first
suppose that John believes that Ann did arrive. This is incompatible with the basic ignorance
requirement of (33). Now suppose that John believes that Ann did not arrive. Then, the basic
ignorance and entertain conditions of (33) are satisfied only if John is wondering whether Bill
arrived. But this is incompatible with the implication ¬Wj(B∨¬B). So, John must be ignorant
as to whether Ann arrived. Similarly, ignorance as to whether Bill arrived follows as well.
In contrast, on the direct account it is wrongly predicted that (33) may be true even if John
already knows that Ann did not arrive, or similarly, if he already knows that Bill did not arrive.
6.2. Plain wh-questions
When wonder takes a plain wh-question as its complement, as in (35-37), the distributive igno-
rance requirement seems to be absent.
(35) Situation: as in (11).
John wonders which of his students arrived. (true)
(36) Situation: as in (21).
Exactly four detectives are wondering which of the suspects did it. (false)
(37) Situation: as in (22).
Every detective is wondering which of the suspects did it. (true)
If the distributive ignorance requirement were present in the same way as in our earlier exam-
ples involving alternative questions, (35) should be judged false, (36) true, and (37) false. The
actual judgments, however, seem to be the opposite.
This contrast is expected under the view that the distributive ignorance requirement is a result of
exhaustification w.r.t. structurally determined alternatives. After all, complements like whether
Ann or Bill arrived count as structural alternatives for whether Ann, Bill or Carol arrived, but
not for which of his students arrived. As a consequence, strong ignorance is predicted to arise
with alternative questions but not with wh-questions.
On the other hand, the contrast is puzzling if the mechanism responsible for the distributive
ignorance requirement is only sensitive to the semantic properties of the complement, as on
the direct account. After all, it is hard to distinguish between alternative questions and wh-
questions in terms of purely semantic properties.
One may attempt to derive the contrast on this approach from the assumption that wh-questions,
unlike alternative questions, may involve implicit domain restriction. That is, (35-37) could be
taken to involve the following implicit domain restrictions:
(38) John wonders which of his students [except Carol] arrived.
(39) Exactly four detectives are wondering which of the suspects
[that they are still suspecting] did it.
(40) Every detective is wondering which of the suspects
[that he is still suspecting] did it.
If this is indeed what is going on, the data is compatible with the direct account. For instance, it
would then be predicted that (39) is false in the given scenario because all five detectives satisfy
the distributive ignorance requirement with respect to the suspects that they are still suspecting.
And similarly for the other examples.
However, on such an account it remains to be explained why the assumed implicit domain
restrictions seem to be obligatory. Prima facie, one would expect that implicit domain restric-
tion is optional, and that various restrictions would be possible, not just the ones explicated
in (38-40). The case of (36)/(39) would be especially puzzling, because this sentence is judged
false in the given context. Under the assumption that implicit domain restriction is optional, the
Charity Principle would favor an interpretation without domain restriction in this case, because
under such an interpretation the sentence would be true in the given scenario. However, the
only interpretation that seems to be available is one on which the sentence is false.
6.3. Wh-questions with listed domain of quantification
Now consider the following variants of (35-37), where the quantificational domain is explicitly
listed.
(41) Situation: as in (35).
John wonders which of Ann, Bill and Carol arrived. (false)
(42) Situation: as in (36).
Exactly four detectives are wondering which of Ann, Bill and Carol did it. (true)
(43) Situation: as in (37).
Every detective is wondering which of Ann, Bill and Carol did it. (false)
We see that ‘list wh-questions’ pattern with alternative questions rather than with plain wh-
questions. This is again expected on the structure-sensitive exhaustivity-based account, because
we have that which of Ann and Bill arrived . which of Ann, Bill and Carol arrived.
Under the direct account, ‘list wh-questions’ are also expected to pattern with alternative ques-
tions under the assumption that they do not permit implicit domain restriction. This assumption
seems quite natural, so the examples in (35-37) arguably do not present any new challenges for
the direct account. However, as discussed above, it remains puzzling why plain wh-questions
would obligatorily involve a specific kind of domain restriction.
An interesting hybrid between plain wh-questions and list wh-questions, as suggested to us by
Brian Buccola, is the following:
(44) Situation A certain linguistics department has one full professor (Jones), three asso-
ciate professors (A, B, and C), and three assistant professors (X, Y, and Z). Jones
is a phonologist and has a question about semantics, which he thinks only a real
semanticist could possibly answer. The only semanticists in the department are A
and C (both associate professors).
Example Jones wonders which assistant or associate professor could answer his ques-
tion. (false)
What is required for (44) to be true is that Jones considers at least one assistant professor
and at least one associate professor possibly capable of answering his question (for instance,
the sentence would be true if, in addition to A and C, Y were a semanticist as well). On the
other hand, it is not required that Jones considers all assistant and associate professors possibly
capable of doing so.
This is straightforwardly accounted for on the exhaustivity-based account, because we have that
which assistant professor and which associate professor are structural alternatives for which
assistant or associate professor. On the other hand, it is not so clear that the direct account
could generate this prediction in a principled way. If we assume that implicit domain restriction
is blocked in (44), just as in alternative questions and list wh-questions, then the predicted
ignorance requirement would be too strong: Jones would have to be ignorant about all assistant
and associate professors. If we assume that implicit domain restriction can apply freely, then
the predicted ignorance requirement would be too weak: it would be predicted that the sentence
is true even if Jones knows that none of the assistant professors are semanticists, as in the given
context. So, some intermediate constraint on domain restriction would be needed, and it is not
clear how such a constraint could be justified.
6.4. Wh-questions with numerical domain specification
Now consider the following variants of (35-37), where the domain of quantification is specified
using a numeral. This has been argued in previous work to strongly disfavor, or even completely
block, implicit domain restriction (Chemla, 2009; Geurts and van Tiel, 2016).
(45) Situation: as in (35).
John wonders which of his three students arrived. (false)
(46) Situation: as in (36).
Exactly four detectives are wondering which of the three suspects did it. (true)
(47) Situation: as in (37).
Every detective is wondering which of the three suspects did it. (false)
We see that ‘numerical wh-questions’ pattern like alternative questions and list wh-questions,
and unlike plain wh-questions. This is predicted by the direct account, under the assumption
that numerical wh-questions don’t allow for implicit domain restriction, just like alternative
questions and list wh-questions.
On the other hand, the contrast between numerical wh-questions and plain wh-questions is not
immediately accounted for under the exhaustivity-based account, because the structural alter-
natives for numerical wh-questions do not include ones such as whether Ann or Bill arrived,
which would be necessary to derive the distributive ignorance requirement from exhaustivity.
There is, however, a possible extension of the exhaustivity-based account formulated above,
which does capture the contrast between numerical wh-questions and plain wh-questions. This
extension incorporates a number of ideas from Chierchia’s (2013) work on different types of
indefinites (plain, NPI, free choice) and their interaction with exhaustification. We will briefly
review these ideas and then return to the case of numerical wh-questions.
First, Chierchia assumes that indefinites and other quantifiers always come with a domain vari-
able D, whose value is contextually determined. For instance, a sentence like Some students
arrived is analyzed as ∃x ∈ D.S(x)∧A(x), involving existential quantification over a contex-
tually given domain D. This assumption is quite widespread, though not everyone agrees that
implicit domains should be represented syntactically.
Second, Chierchia proposes that sentences involving a quantifier with domain variable D gener-
ate so-called sub-domain alternatives, which involve quantification over a subdomain D′ ⊆ D.
For instance, the sub-domain alternatives of Some students arrived are ∃x ∈D′.S(x)∧A(x), for
any D′ ⊆ D. Crucially for us, Chierchia proposes that these sub-domain alternatives can serve
as input for exhaustivity operators, alongside structurally determined alternatives. Whether
they actually play this role depends on whether they are activated. Chierchia proposes that the
sub-domain alternatives generated by plain indefinites are only optionally activated. On the
other hand, the sub-domain alternatives of specially marked indefinites (such as any and ever)
are obligatorily activated, and therefore must always serve as input for an exhaustivity operator.
This has certain interpretational consequences, and also accounts for the restricted distribution
of such marked indefinites. For instance, the ungrammaticality of a sentence like Any students
arrived is accounted for by the fact that exhaustification w.r.t. the sub-domain alternatives gen-
erated by any yields a contradiction in this case. On the other hand, in John didn’t expect any
students, exhaustification w.r.t. sub-domain alternatives does not yield a contradiction.
Now let us return to the contrast between plain wh-phrases (e.g., which of his students) and
numerical wh-phrases (e.g., which of his three students). Extending Chierchia’s ideas to wh-
phrases, it would be natural to assume that (i) wh-phrases always come with a domain vari-
able and generate sub-domain alternatives, (ii) the sub-domain alternatives generated by plain
wh-phrases are only optionally activated, but (iii) the sub-domain alternatives generated by spe-
cially marked wh-phrases, such as numerical ones, are obligatorily activated and therefore must
serve as the input for an exhaustivity operator.
Given this, it is natural to assume that the exhaustivity operator in the lexical semantics of
wonder is not only sensitive to structurally determined alternatives for the complement clause,
but also to its sub-domain alternatives, when activated. Using SDA(Q) to denote the set of
activated sub-domain alternatives generated by Q, this can be implemented as follows:
(48) pwonder Qq = λx.EXH{Wx(pQ′q) | Q′ . Q}︸ ︷︷ ︸
structural alternatives
∪ {Wx(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ SDA(Q)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
sub-domain alternatives
Wx(pQq)
Under this treatment of wonder, we get exactly the desired predictions. For instance, (45)
now implies, due to exhaustification w.r.t. sub-domain alternatives, that John is not wondering
which of Ann and Bill arrived. This implication is false in the given context, so the sentence as
a whole comes out false as well. And similarly for (46) and (47).
Thus, while the exhaustivity-based account needs to be further worked out and tested on a
broader range of empirical data, it seems to be able to capture some interesting contrasts, and
to have an advantage over the direct account in that it does not rely on particular constraints on
implicit domain restriction which would seem difficult to motivate independently.
7. Conclusion
If an inquisitive predicate like wonder takes an alternative question as its complement, it implies
that its subject is ignorant about each of the alternatives introduced by the question. This
implication, which we call the distributive ignorance requirement, is not predicted by previous
work on the semantics of wonder. Furthermore, a pragmatic approach to deriving distributive
ignorance faces a number of challenges (non-monotonicity, obligatoriness, and locality). We
thus considered two semantic accounts: one that directly encodes a strong form of ignorance
in the meaning of wonder and the other based on a built-in exhaustivity operator.
To tease apart these two semantic accounts, we looked at four types of questions as the com-
plement of wonder: polar questions involving a disjunction, plain wh-questions, wh-questions
with a listed domain of quantification and wh-questions with a numerical domain specifica-
tion. The fact that the distributive ignorance requirement is absent with ‘plain’ wh-questions
but present with polar questions involving a disjunction and ‘list’ wh-questions suggests that
the distributive ignorance requirement is sensitive to the structure of the complement. This
is expected on the exhaustivity-based account, which comes with a structure-sensitive notion
of alternatives (Katzir, 2007). Furthermore, although at first sight the presence of distribu-
tive ignorance with ‘numerical’ wh-questions seemed unexpected under the exhaustivity-based
account, we proposed that it could be accounted for by incorporating exhaustification w.r.t.
sub-domain alternatives (Chierchia, 2013). On the other hand, in order to capture the contrasts
between the different types of wh-questions, the ‘direct’ account would have to invoke partic-
ular constraints on implicit domain restriction. Given that such constraints seem difficult to
motivate independently, we conclude that the exhaustivity-based approach is more promising.
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